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Abstract: 
Deconstruction often sits awkwardly between the realm of literary studies and 
criticism, and philosophy proper. This paper explores the contribution that a 
deconstructive literacy might have for those engaged in writing narrative, as a practice 
and a product. Taking up Kristeva's reading of Arendt, and the Aristotelian categories 
of praxis and poiesis, it will be argued that the act of narrating life amounts to both the 
actual generation of the life it purports to describe, while also being a praxis in itself, 
one that need not produce anything, since the very act of engaging in/with it, leaves a 
traceless trace that itself is 'full of meaning'. Narrative, however, will not rest in either 
pole of Aristotle's binary structure. For Arendt, Kristeva will remind us, narrative is an 
activity that is very 'human', where we engender not just zoe, mere physiological life, 
but bios, a living that is not colonised by ends alone, and instead finding in itself a 
value, a fulfilment in its own process. Applied to the activity of story-making 
(autobiographical or otherwise), and also to pedagogical practice in the academy, this 
dual potential of narrative (at once to produce and to be an end unto itself) reframes the 
Beruf (calling) of creative writing. Deconstruction, in other words, assists us in 
appreciating the very ethical consequences of the labour of deciding where and when 
the story begins and ends, and who the protagonist is. Recalling us to the ontological 
implications of the thought of différance, this paper will attempt to demonstrate how 
the action of articulating the edges of story can be read as akin to that which turns the 
featureless flux of time into bios, or human life that, according to Arendt, is what goes 
missing under totalitarianism. 
 
Biographical note: 
Antonia Pont recently completed her doctoral studies at the University of Melbourne, 
with a thesis consisting of a poetic prose work of inaccurate autobiography, and a 
philosophical dissertation on Derrida and How to Do Things with Sadness. She is 
based mostly in Melbourne, though wonders at times about the appellation neo-nomad 
and whether it applies to her. She is not, however, very sophisticated in her attitudes to 
data-storage and doesn't own a smart device, so it probably doesn't. She writes poems 
that are more like enjambed narratives, and narratives that are a lot like unemjambed 
poems. She may need to see a therapist to unravel the complexities of this relation to 
hard returns. 
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The chief characteristic of this specifically human life, whose appearance and 
disappearance constitute worldly events, is that it is itself always full of events which 
ultimately can be told as a story, establish a biography; it is of this life, bios as 
distinguished from zoe, that Aristotle said that it ‘somehow is a kind of praxis.’ 
(Quoted by J. Kristeva in Hannah Arendt: Life Is a Narrative, 8). 
 
Introduction 
This conference takes up the opportunity, among others, of welcoming fertile 
dialogue between the discipline of literary studies and creative writing. In this paper, 
I will enact to some degree, a thinking and a reframing of a central aspect of creative 
writing – that is, narrative – via the lens of deconstruction and a renowned pair of 
Aristotelian categories. 
Let us quote Rainer Maria Rilke, from ‘The First Elegy’: 
All of the living, though, 
make the mistake of drawing too sharp distinctions. 
Angels (it’s said) would be often unable to tell 
whether they moved among the living or the dead.  
The eternal torrent whirls all the ages through either realm 
forever, and sounds above their voices in both. 
The human, non-angelic realm, in other words, depends on the drawing of 
distinctions. This is perhaps clear to us in a common-sense way, but deconstruction, 
which sits mischievously between the fields of literary criticism and philosophy 
proper, has also trained us in our recognition of binary operations, and the way these 
constrain, but also engender our worlds. Deconstruction has also drawn our attention 
to our on-going struggle with the thinking and acknowledging of difference, so much 
so that this everyday word, at least in the academy, may often carry a distinctly 
deconstructive inflection. 
In Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida writes: 
Origin of the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the 
trace, permits the difference between space and time to be articulated, to appear as 
such, in the unity of an appearance (of a “same” lived out of a “same” body proper 
[corps propre]). […] It is from the primary possibility of this articulation that one must 
begin. Difference is articulation. (1997: 65-66) 
In the realm of appearance or presentation, things appear to be consistent, as if their 
fabric were stable, and not the result of the topplings of différance. Time, too, 
emerges from a featureless continuity due to the operation of articulating, whereby 
the out-of-jointness proclaimed by Shakespeare’s Hamlet emerges as the very thing 
that makes human life possible at all. Time is, by definition, out of joint. In other 
words, were time in-joint, it mightn’t be time as we know it.  
This deconstructive notion of time (and, as we shall see shortly, life) as an always-
already broken-togetherness that functions thanks-to and not despite this quality, 
counters a more traditional metaphysical approach that would perpetuate the fantasy 
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of simple or pure presence. That with which Derrida counters (non-dialectically) the 
notion of presence will be the trace, as that ‘which does not let itself be summed up in 
the simplicity of a present’ (1997: 66). The trace slips away from an argument with 
presence. It does not compete. It offers nothing as a provocation to presence’s 
sovereignty, and yet it is such a provocation. Deconstructive practice introduces a 
quaver into the foundational categories upon which a traditional metaphysics would 
build its edifice. This edifice, of course, after deconstruction, remains. Its workings 
are revealed. It is not destroyed, but its force is altered in a way that can almost, I 
contend, only be pragmatically observed. Deconstruction, in other words, does. It is a 
praxis. 
 
Creative Writing: praxis or poiesis 
In her reading of The Human Condition (1958), Julia Kristeva summarises Arendt’s 
framing of the Aristotelian binary of praxis and poiesis: 
[Arendt’s] reading of the Nicomachean Ethics leads her to distinguish… poiesis, an 
activity of production, from praxis, an activity of action. Arendt alerts us to the 
internal limitations in the production of works: labour and ‘works’ or ‘products’ ‘reify’ 
the fluidity of human experience within ‘objects’ which we ‘use’ as ‘means’ with a 
view to a given ‘end’; the seeds of the reification and utilitarianism to which the 
human condition succumbs are already within poiesis understood this way. (2001: 14) 
Poiesis, then, would be marked by having a teleology, an end in view that may be a 
thing of substance, or at least quantifiable. Wood-working, for example, leads to a 
produced table, and what matters is the usefulness, the utilitarian value of the table.  
Kristeva then goes on to explain praxis: 
Conceptualized with the notion of energeia (actuality) by Aristotle, praxis includes 
activities that are not orientated towards a specific goal (ateleis) and leave behind no 
created work (par’autas erga), but instead ‘are exhausted within an action that is itself 
full of meaning.’ (2001: 14) 
Praxis would actualise itself, as itself, and not necessarily as a means to something 
else. Its only trace, dare we state it this way, is a relational – rather than a substantial 
– one. This would be the art of the artist (perhaps Woolf’s writer with a room of her 
own). It would be the process of placing paint on the canvas, or moving the body 
around the dance studio, but not in order to produce a work that could sell, nor a 
video documentation of the choreography. For Arendt, praxis will relate to the life of 
the polis and to something which she defines as specific to the human: narrative. 
When, for example, we are not worrying about the publication or otherwise of our 
papers from this conference, our activities here together over these days, might be 
considered praxis. 
There is a way in which writing (or the making/making of texts) can, as one possible 
mode for narrative, be analysed using the lens of these two terms. What, in the first 
instance, would the features or attitude be of a writing that conformed to the notion of 
poiesis? 
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It might – hypothetically – involve a writing that was specifically oriented in its 
production goal, and directed towards an outcome that could be known in advance. 
For a writing conforming to poiesis, the action (verb) of the writer would mean little 
aside from its needing to generate the outcome such as the published artefact, fame or 
royalties, for example, or even (as was the case in U.S. creative writing courses in the 
1920s and 30s (Brook 2010)) an improvement in literacy levels. 
On the other hand, praxis might be at play in various and unidentified ways in the 
daily activity of many types of writers. This reminds us of Rilke’s confidence to his 
young poet that one probably should only write if one absolutely has to (see the first 
letter of 1954). Such writers, who are compelled to engage in the writing process, are 
possibly less motivated by the tangible outcome and therefore more aligned with the 
praxis side of the Arendtian/Aristotelian binary.  
It is obvious, however, that there is no pure example of either praxis or poiesis, but 
that these modes would hold varying degrees of sway in the process of writing, which 
is both a kind of object-making and an experience in and of itself, as Brenda Walker 
confided to us in her keynote address at this conference. The lens, however, offered 
by Aristotle, taken up by Arendt and Kristeva, and reframed by deconstruction, does 
do a particular work for thinking. This binary-tool can allow an analysis of 
motivations and subtle differences in approach to be identified and somehow 
rigorously described.  
An overly dominant poiesis approach might, as Arendt seems to suggest, tacitly lead 
in the direction of totalitarianism, where “men” themselves become tools for 
outcomes alone, and that no-one’s life, including that of the ‘totalitarian man’, holds 
any meaning or worth at all. (Kristeva 2001: 4) This is the possible unfolding at the 
extreme end of poiesis’ spectrum. Writing programs, too, that over-emphasise the 
aspect of poiesis may become compromised and somehow artistically eviscerated.  
Similarly, there would be a point where the emphasis on praxis (on action or the 
activity itself) becomes unhelpfully hyperbolic, in the academy and beyond. Take the 
disdainful artist who, fearful of the threat of poiesis contaminating the purity of her 
process, cannot deign to allow anything to come to fruition in a substantial or 
saleable form. This, among other factors, may lead to starving artists, the ivory-tower 
syndrome, or ghettoisation.  
Without sliding towards a fundamentalism, a praxis-inflected approach can take the 
pressure off obsessing about where everything’s going and what is going to come, 
and focus instead on the fecundity of process, the pleasure (or not) of the activity, the 
discipline of craft, and perhaps afford a certain “integrity” to the final work itself, 
which arguably may store traces of this approach in the tangibility of its form.  
What is helpful, I would suggest, is that Aristotle’s distinction highlights a 
grammatical aspect relating to work, making or the creative in general, which is that 
poiesis operates nominally – that is, in relation to resulting substance, or thingness. 
Praxis, in contrast, is an approach that forces the verb into view. Rather than solely 
noticing what comes, the emphasis is shifted to the how of activity. 
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Narrative as ‘human’ activity – the praxis of inventing the life described 
Kristeva will identify in Arendt the idea that the capacity for, and engagement with, 
story-making is what renders the so-called human, specifically human (2001, 7). 
There will seem to be, for Arendt, a difference between ‘mere’ zoe, and bios. The 
making of the events of (a) life into story, into a biographical entity – through a 
process of identifying where life (the story) begins and ends – is what will be 
particular to the category called ‘human’. Kristeva writes: 
… the possibility of narrating – grounds human life in what is specific to it, in what is 
non-animal about it, non-physiological. While implicitly evoking Nietzsche, who sees 
‘the will to power’ as a normal desire in life, and also invoking implicitly Heidegger, 
who steers Nietzsche’s biologism towards the ‘serenity’ of poetic expression, Arendt 
rehabilitates the praxis of the narrative. (2001: 8) 
It is uninteresting, for the thrust of the overall argument here, to submit uncritically to 
Arendt’s apparently ‘natural’ distinction between bios and zoe. Like the 
praxis/poiesis pair, the positing of such a clear demarcation may serve mostly as a 
lens. That is to say, with it we recruit a purely theoretical opposition as a frame of 
reference, but one that nevertheless cannot stand in any static way. 
One of the difficult contributions from the deconstructive advent in philosophy might 
pertain to this issue of how to approach classical binary distinctions, that when placed 
under pressure fall asunder. Derrida has been clear (see 1997: 13 & 14) that it can’t 
be a matter of abandoning this legacy, but rather that the task for thinking is to 
inhabit it carefully, and with an understanding of its ‘hydraulics’ (my term) – that is, 
an ability to appreciate the practicality of such framings in particular instances, yet 
also to understand their mechanism at various levels of abstraction. It could be 
summed up, perhaps, as a kind of playful caution: one that includes and complicates. 
So, it is the process of the activity of narration that interests Arendt, it seems. While 
also speaking of what makes a good story, and so forth, at this juncture in her writing, 
what is at stake is something that humans do, which for her is ‘non-physiological’, 
that is, it has no obvious utilitarian or survival-related purpose, apart from the fact 
that the activity of making-narrative valorises life, in a way that may offset a 
totalitarian trajectory. 
Narrative activity, then, would contribute little (superficially) to the bare ticking over 
of breathing beings, but it nevertheless allows the beings that engage in it, a particular 
kind of quality, and one that might be politically desirable. If story matters politically, 
I would suggest, then one should not dismiss so readily its relevance for the ‘mere 
zoe’ of survival. 
Making-Story, in other words, has a force in relation to the between of humans, but 
not explicitly in terms of their crudest tangible economies, or the human as mere-life. 
Kristeva points out that between-two is the root for the word interest: inter-esse. 
(2001: 14) If that which, according to Arendt, makes the human specifically-human is 
this facilitating of a between (in narrative practice) or an inter-esse, narrative would 
seem to intimate itself as something also relevant to the so-called ontological. At this 
point deconstruction comes to our aid. 
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Although the term, ‘narrative’ would seem to imply that it is the result of something 
being narrated, there is a paradox inherent in Kristeva’s reading. In our praxis of 
telling, we in fact call into being the very thing purportedly narrated. When we 
narrate life, in other words, we invent the life narrated. 
 
Beginnings, endings and characters, or articulated decisions 
Kristeva will say that, crucial to narrative practice and human-ness, is the ability to 
identify when a story begins and ends. Kristeva informs us that Arendt does not make 
central the cohesion or plot of narrative, so much as: 
…firstly to recognize the ‘moment of ending or closure,’ and secondly to ‘identify the 
agent’ of the story. The art of narrative resides in the ability to condense the action into 
an exemplary moment, to extract it from the continuous flow of time… (2001: 17) 
In the dovetailing of the threads of our discussion up until now, we find something 
curious emerging. Arendt will place emphasis on the inter-esse, on narrative-as-
activity, and on the decision of where a ‘story’ begins or ends. Additionally, Derrida, 
as I read him, implies that différance can be understood as a non-originary-originary 
‘operation’ that precedes the nominal. 
I would like to argue that the basic, structural operation that permits what we identify 
as story to emerge, has something in common with the very workings of the 
différance of deconstruction. This structural operation – of designating beginnings, 
endings or protagonists (that is, point-of-view, to some degree) involves the 
movement of the trace, the marking – if you like – of the edges that permit 
appearance to appear.  
I will only have a love story, for example, if I mark out within the multiplicity of 
minutiae of days and months, conversations, and the rubrics of bodies and landscapes 
the kind of ‘cut’ which brings forth that emphasis. The ‘same’ minutiae of detail 
could let arise a tale of economics, of domesticity, of friendship, and even allow a 
different protagonist to “appear”.  
If this be the case, then if the two structures – of Arendtian Making-Story and 
Derridean différance – are analogously laid alongside one another, and if we take up 
Arendt’s offering that narrative makes ‘life’ (bios) from ‘mere life’ (zoe), then to 
write of a life (which would include speaking, as something included in an expanded 
notion of writing) would amount simultaneously to making that life – to inventing 
life, so to speak. And not just one sole life, but many lives, always already – since a 
single, definitive life is never possible.  
Even if English doesn’t distinguish between the fiction of this raw life, or continuous 
‘flow of time’ which consequently is eventless, and the ‘life’ that we identify as 
living, making ‘us’ as subjects or humans appear to ourselves, we seem to be able to 
almost think this distinction, to know that there may be a qualitative difference 
between our life and things just rolling onwards. I read Arendt to be suggesting that 
such a “valuing” praxis of “perceiving-telling-inventing” is what makes the category 
“human" mean what we widely assume it to mean. 
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It would seem that humans – and this for Arendt implies the possibility of humanity 
itself – do something to life in general (zoe) but presumably also to their own lives, 
by embarking on the labour of telling [le récit]. Narrative has a certain consequence 
for this quality, and makes life, or lived experience of various kinds, something else, 
while also – at once – leaving it the same.  
The Show-Don’t-Tell truism of the creative writing classroom would seem to 
validate the fact that the transformative consequences for this mere life may be 
greater sometimes, the more closely narrative process accompanies the bare and 
unadorned detail of the former. Toni Morrison will speak of this ‘accompanying’ (my 
term) that is narrative practice, not in terms of fact, but in terms of an ‘integrity’ that 
leads to what she considers truth, which is the guiding preoccupation of the ‘literary 
archeolog[ist]’ (see generally Morrison 1995). 
In the case of autobiography, the charge of indulgence is one with which the writer 
narrative, for example, must regularly contend. It can also be a charge levelled – like 
a double bind – at Creative Writing programs, in general, viewed as not producing 
enough commercially, but contrarily, producing too much, that is, not attending 
sufficiently to a purely intellectual praxis, in the ways generally validated by the 
academy.  
Such accusations function both at the level of poiesis and of praxis.  
In terms of the former, if writing is asked to function as a product, then it is asked to 
produce something, rather than being acknowledged as the a particular doing in and 
for itself. The narrative-as-product may function due to its entertainment value, its 
political impact, or its pedagogical capacity.  
If we read, however, the labour of creative writing through the lens of praxis, framed 
as a more generalised form of practice-based work, and one that might be taken up by 
any story-maker, the action of narrating (as verb) can be framed as a kind of 
discipline, the products of which might or might not be interesting for a reading 
public, for historical purposes, or for a specific community, literary or otherwise. 
 
Conclusion 
To return to Arendt, the identification of character, framed as being crucial to good 
story, and the distillation of the ‘exemplary moment’ (Kristeva 2001: 17) extracted 
from the flow of time, as a human-acknowledged event, might be both relevant to 
actual living as well as to the vocational crafting of tales. To understand who we are, 
what kind of ‘life’ we are in, and who our loves, friends and enemies might be, 
demands that we have always-already embarked upon decisions also pertinent to the 
narrative practitioner. Derrida, in this regards, reminds us of what he calls the ‘hyper-
ethical sacrifice’ in his later work The Gift of Death: 
What binds me to singularities, to this one or that one, male or female, rather than that 
one or this one, remains finally unjustifiable (this is Abraham's hyper-ethical sacrifice), 
as unjustifiable as the infinite sacrifice I make at each moment. These singularities 
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represent others, a wholly other form of alterity: one other or some other persons, but 
also places, animals, languages. (1995: 71) 
In having been bequeathed this plight of the obligation to sacrifice something for 
something else, always and into the future (as the very making of ‘future’), it could 
be said that we each practice the nuts-and-bolts of narrative, always already. 
Narration is, for me, an encounter with the impossibility of any foundational totality. 
To narrate is always already to supplement a life that isn’t whole, to labour 
impossibly towards making it whole, to giving it conceptually digestible edges. And 
these efforts always fail, partially, but also succeed in their unendedness. The stories 
we tell to try to make something of the deferrals and dis-articulations of ‘our 
experience’ are by definition a kind of gracious failure. It is as if we would attempt to 
circumscribe our multiplicities, to strangle ourselves with the edges of the known and 
pre-empted, but that something within writing, within the praxis and mechanism of 
narrative itself, offers us the impossibility of this as a kind of secular blessing. The 
circle in Derrida is never closed, contamination is always already there. It might be 
akin the fermentation of food, the way that the very bacteria that render the food 
‘impure’, are what permits it to be digested and to nourish the body at all. Pure food, 
in this analogy, is pointless food. Pure categories, as deconstruction demonstrates, are 
lifeless categories. 
We narrate life in order to invent it, and to fail continually at inventing it once and for 
all. There will be no definitive definition of any experience, and this is both 
infuriating (when what we think we seek is closure and certainty), but it is also what 
would save us, and allow the future to remain open. It gives us options other than the 
worst (see 1994: 34). Derrida distils for us something about the enduring paradox of 
telling about the world, our worlds, when, referring to Shakespeare’s Timon of 
Athens, he quotes: “How goes the world? – It wears, sir, as it grows” (1994: 97). 
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